Are Too Many Patents as Bad for the Economy as Too Few?
In his recent New Yorker article, The Permission Problem, financial reporter James Surowiecki reviews Columbia law professor Michael Heller's new book, “The Gridlock Economy.”
TGE decries the development of an "anti-commons" in a business climate possessed by the demon of possession. As Surowiecki explains:
Property rights (including patents) are essential to economic growth, providing incentives to innovate and invest. But property rights need to be limited to be effective. The more we divide common resources like science and culture into small, fenced-off lots, Heller shows, the more difficult we make it for people to do business and to build something new. Innovation, investment, and growth end up being stifled.
. . . The effects of overuse are generally unmistakable—you can’t miss the empty nets of fishing boats working overfished oceans, or the scrub that covers an overgrazed field. But the effects of underuse created by too much ownership are often invisible. They’re mainly things that don’t happen: inventions that don’t get made, useful drugs that never get to market.
In theory, one should be able to break a gridlock by striking a deal that would leave all sides better off. Sometimes that happens. Just the other week, for instance, Nokia and Qualcomm settled a three-year-long patent battle, which could accelerate the spread of third-generation cell-phone technology here and in Europe. . .
One reason deals founder is that there are simply too many interested parties. If, in order to create a new drug, you have to strike bargains with thirty or forty other companies, it’s easy to decide that the price is too high. But often things go awry because owners won’t make a deal at a reasonable price. . . .
Why are deals with so many potential patent holders difficult to impossible? Surowiecki explains:
Recent experimental work by the psychologist Sven Vanneste and the legal scholar Ben Depoorter [demonstrate that] [w]hen something you own is necessary to the success of a venture, even if its contribution is small, you’ll tend to ask for an amount close to the full value of the venture. And since everyone in your position also thinks he deserves a huge sum, the venture quickly becomes unviable.
So the next time we start handing out new ownership rights—whether via patents or copyright or privatization schemes—we’d better try to weigh all the good things that won’t happen as a result. Otherwise, we won’t know what we’ve been missing.
For the full article, click here (emphasis added). For further coverage on Heller's book, check out Tim Wu's review at Slate and the WSJ Law Blog's coverage here.
